One ledger, eight identities
Every sensitive field encrypted with AES-256-GCM, with its own random IV.
Your passwords, your control.
Secure your passwords, passkeys, 2FA, and bank cards with AES-256-GCM encryption. Local-first, optional iCloud sync.
Built on modern iOS primitives
One ledger, only yours. No third copy, anywhere.
Not a 'password app' — an encrypted ledger that consolidates every digital identity in one place. All eight item types go through the same field-level encryption pipeline.
No second app needed
Scan to save. AutoFill fills the 6-digit code along with the password.
A strong one, in a second
Random string or EFF wordlist phrase. Live entropy meter.
FIDO2 / WebAuthn
Generated and stored locally. Private key never leaves the device in plaintext.
HIBP · k-anonymity
Only the first 5 chars of the SHA-1 hash leave the device. Your password never does.
Safari · apps · keyboard — one step
System-level AutoFill extension. Face ID confirms; codes get filled in too.
End-to-end · optional
Routed via Apple's private CloudKit. Sensitive fields are encrypted on-device before upload — only ciphertext reaches the server. Toggle off anytime to go fully local.
Yours to keep, anytime
1Password · Bitwarden · LastPass · KeePass · Dashlane · Apple Keychain. Three export formats: JSON / CSV (plaintext) + encrypted .bytegx.
Edited wrong? Deleted by accident? Recoverable.
Every password change saves the previous value — up to 5 history versions kept, one-tap rollback. Deleted items go to a recycle bin and clear after the retention window.
Clipboard counts down. App locks itself.
Pasteboard auto-clears across 5 presets (15-90s); foreground / background auto-lock configured separately (always-on, can't be disabled).
Tap from the lock screen, password's there
Two widgets: quick vault access + on-the-fly password generator.
Three things I refused to compromise on
Built-in TOTP, on-device security audit, and Passkeys — the three places where ByteGuard most clearly out-engineers the average password manager.
Codes, without juggling two apps.
Scan to save — every 2FA in one place. The detail page shows the live code with a countdown ring; long-press to copy. With AutoFill, the code goes in along with username and password.
- RFC 6238 TOTP, 6/8 digits · SHA-1 / 256 / 512 HMAC
- iCloud cross-device sync (E2E encrypted, Premium)
- Three export formats: JSON / CSV (plaintext) + encrypted .bytegx
You can only fix what you can see.
Backed by Have I Been Pwned with the k-anonymity protocol — only the first 5 chars of the SHA-1 hash ever leave the device. Every weakness comes with a concrete next step.
- Detects leaked / weak / reused / outdated
- HIBP k-anonymity (SHA-1 prefix-5); plaintext never sent
- One tap jumps to the entry to replace
Private keys never leave the device.
WebAuthn / FIDO2 standard. ES256 (ECDSA P-256, COSE alg -7). Private keys are AES-256-GCM encrypted with the Item Key — plaintext never written to disk. AutoFillExtension handles registration and assertion via the Apple system bridge.
- ES256 (ECDSA P-256, COSE -7)
- AutoFill Extension handles registration + assertion
- iCloud E2E encrypted sync (Premium)
Here's what it actually looks like
Ten screens, in scenario order — the whole app walked through. No marketing copy.
Every digital identity, in one place.
Top 10 / All / Favorites / Logins multi-view; live filtered search. All eight DataType cases run the full field-level encryption pipeline — not a 'password app', but a digital-identity ledger.
- 8 types: login / card / API key / identity / note / license / passkey / OAuth token
- Each entry gets its own AES-256-GCM key; plaintext never leaves the device
- Local-first; optional iCloud end-to-end encrypted sync
Codes, without juggling two apps.
Scan to save — every 2FA in one place. The detail page shows the live code with a countdown ring; long-press to copy. With AutoFill, the code goes in along with username and password.
- RFC 6238 TOTP, 6/8 digits · SHA-1 / 256 / 512 HMAC
- iCloud cross-device sync (E2E encrypted, Premium)
- Three export formats: JSON / CSV (plaintext) + encrypted .bytegx
One entry — every field at once.
Login detail: username, password, history, linked TOTP, website, custom fields. Each sensitive field independently decrypted with its own IV, shown only on demand. Copy auto-clears the clipboard.
- Each sensitive field independently AES-256-GCM encrypted with its own IV
- TOTP / Passkey two-way linking shown together
- Copy auto-clears clipboard (5 presets)
Made a typo? Deleted by mistake? Recoverable.
Every change saves the previous value (spec:R3 — up to 5 versions kept); tap the timeline to restore. Deleted items are retained for 90 days before permanent removal.
- Up to 5 history versions kept
- Four source markers: manual / AutoFill / imported / sync
- Deleted items retained 90 days
You can only fix what you can see.
Backed by Have I Been Pwned with the k-anonymity protocol — only the first 5 chars of the SHA-1 hash ever leave the device. Every weakness comes with a concrete next step.
- Detects leaked / weak / reused / outdated
- HIBP k-anonymity (SHA-1 prefix-5); plaintext never sent
- One tap jumps to the entry to replace
A strong one — in one second.
Random (4-64 chars / exclude look-alikes / digits-only for PIN) or EFF passphrase, with live entropy meter. Replaces the old value and records the change in history.
- Two modes: random (incl. PIN) + EFF passphrase
- Apple system CSPRNG (Swift Int.random + SecRandomCopyBytes)
- Live entropy meter and strength indicator
Tap in Safari, and the password fills itself.
AutoFill Extension uses Apple's official ASCredentialProviderViewController; after Face ID / Touch ID, the username, password and TOTP all go in together. Info.plist also declares SupportsSavePasswordCredentials, so new passwords save back to ByteGuard from any flow.
- ASCredentialProviderViewController, system-level credential provider
- Safari + third-party apps, all flows covered
- Unlock via Face ID / Touch ID; TOTP delivered in the same step
Private keys never leave the device.
WebAuthn / FIDO2 standard. ES256 (ECDSA P-256, COSE alg -7). Private keys are AES-256-GCM encrypted with the Item Key — plaintext never written to disk. AutoFillExtension handles registration and assertion via the Apple system bridge.
- ES256 (ECDSA P-256, COSE -7)
- AutoFill Extension handles registration + assertion
- iCloud E2E encrypted sync (Premium)
PAN encrypted, CVV never stored.
Card number (PAN) gets its own AES-256-GCM key with a unique IV. Cardholder name, expiry, brand (Visa / Mastercard / etc.) stay searchable as metadata. CVV/CVC are never persisted on this device.
- PAN encrypted; BIN (first 4-6) / last 4 shown in plaintext
- CVV/CVC never persisted on device
- Cardholder / expiry / brand / billing-address metadata
Dark / Light / System.
AppearanceMode three modes: system / light / dark — switch any time, no restart. Premium tier unlocks multi-color themes; Home Screen widgets stay in sync.
- AppearanceMode three modes: system / light / dark
- Multi-color themes (Premium)
- Home Screen widgets follow theme
Zero-knowledge, in the literal sense.
Your master password never leaves your device. Your Secret Key is generated locally and stored in Apple Keychain — synced across your Apple devices through Apple's end-to-end encrypted Keychain (you can also keep it on a single device). Both keys are required to decrypt your data, and neither I nor Apple can read either one. This isn't a promise — it's the architecture.
Argon2id key derivation
password + Secret Key + 32B salt → Master Key. Parameters: 64 MB memory · 3 iterations. Resistant to GPU/ASIC brute force.
HKDF-SHA256 key hierarchy
Master Key → KEK → random DEK. Each vault gets its own DEK — no horizontal decryption path.
Field-level AES-256-GCM
Every sensitive field encrypted independently · new random IV on every write. Same plaintext → different ciphertext · authenticated tag prevents tampering.
128-bit Secret Key
A random key (a 12-word BIP39 mnemonic in form), independent of the master password. Even if the master password leaks, your vault still cannot be opened without it.
This isn't "won't" — it's architecturally "can't".
- See, access, or decrypt your stored data
- Reset your master password
- Recover a vault without your Secret Key
- Hand over decrypted data to anyone — by architecture, no party can decrypt without your master password
- Plant a backdoor in the encryption flow
- Collect analytics or crash reports
What I built. What I chose not to.
No competitor table. No checkmarks. Just an indie developer listing — plainly — what I wrote, and what I deliberately didn't. Read it, then decide whether to trust me with your ledger.
— WHAT I BUILT —
Field-level AES-256-GCM
Every sensitive field encrypted independently, with its own random IV.
Argon2id key derivation
64 MB memory × 3 iterations — resistant to GPU/ASIC brute force.
128-bit Secret Key
A random key independent of the master password — your second line of defense.
Full offline mode
iCloud sync can be turned off in one tap; the app falls back to pure local storage.
HIBP k-anonymity lookup
Only the first 5 chars of the SHA-1 hash are sent — your password never leaves the device.
Native system integration
AutoFill, Passkey, and TOTP all use Apple's official APIs. No reinvented wheels.
Zero third-party SDKs
No analytics. No tracking. No ads. No crash reporters.
— WHAT I CHOSE NOT TO —
No web app or browser extension
XSS, extension supply-chain attacks, CDN takeovers — that surface is excluded by architecture, not policy.
No Android or Windows builds
Each platform means re-implementing the crypto primitives correctly. Get one line wrong and the whole chain breaks.
No team or enterprise sharing
Sharing is trust delegation — I'm still working out how to do it right. Until I am, I won't ship it.
No self-hosting option
Under zero-knowledge, self-hosting just shifts the operational burden to you with no real security gain.
No third-party audit yet
Honestly: I haven't paid for one yet. The /security page documents every crypto decision against the source so anyone can verify independently. Independent audit + open-sourcing the crypto core are both on the roadmap (target dates Q3-Q4 2026, will update if delayed) — follow the GitHub repo to be notified when they land.
No "recover master password" path
If I could recover it, it wouldn't be zero-knowledge. The most reliable backup is still old-school: write your master password and Secret Key on paper and store them apart.
No aggressive release cadence
Crypto-related changes will move very conservatively. Stability over novelty.
Simple. Fair. Your call.
No hidden fees. Subscribe monthly, yearly, or buy once for life. All billing handled by Apple.
About this app, and the person who built it.
Who are you? Why should I trust you with my passwords?
I'm the developer behind ByteGuard, working on it solo. Background: I spent years building payment systems — from core transaction logic to payment gateway integrations — handling API keys, sensitive credentials, and financial data every day. PCI DSS compliance, zero-trust architecture, and key hierarchy management weren't first introduced to me by ByteGuard — they're my day job. That's the lens I built this app with. No team, no funding, no third-party security audit yet (I list this honestly in the "What I built / What I chose not to" section above). What I can offer isn't brand trust, but the architecture itself: - Master password never leaves your device (my server has never seen it) - Secret Key is either device-local (maximum security mode) or end-to-end encrypted via Apple Keychain — even Apple can't read it - My server holds nothing that can decrypt your data If you value "big-company brand + third-party audit" certainty, 1Password and Bitwarden are excellent choices. I respect that choice.
What if I forget my master password?
I can't recover it. That's the cost of zero-knowledge: I can't reset what I never knew. Use Face ID / Touch ID for daily unlocking, and write your master password and Secret Key on a piece of paper kept in a safe or a bank deposit box. It sounds 1990s — and it remains the most reliable backup we have.
What if I lose my Secret Key?
It depends on whether you enabled iCloud Keychain sync for your Secret Key. If iCloud Keychain sync is enabled (the default-recommended setup): your Secret Key is end-to-end encrypted by Apple and synchronized across all your Apple devices. On a new device, sign in with your Apple ID and your Secret Key restores automatically — you only need to remember your master password. If iCloud Keychain sync is disabled (maximum security, you keep both keys yourself): the Secret Key never leaves the device it was generated on. Your only backup is the 12-word recovery phrase (BIP39 standard) shown when you first created the vault. Write it on paper and store it separately from your master password. Without that paper backup, the Secret Key cannot be restored on a new device. Either way: your master password is still required to decrypt anything — Secret Key alone is not enough. And I have never seen a single bit of either: my server holds nothing that can decrypt your data, and Apple cannot read your Secret Key either (it's E2E encrypted within their Keychain layer).
Is iCloud sync really safe? Apple can't see anything?
All sensitive fields are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before they ever leave the device. iCloud receives ciphertext only; even I don't have the key (the key never leaves your device). If you'd rather not use the cloud at all, you can turn sync off in settings — the app falls back to a fully local mode, which is a perfectly legitimate way to use it.
Why not Android / Windows / Web?
Two reasons. One person can only maintain so much code, and cross-platform means re-implementing crypto primitives correctly on each — get one line wrong and the whole chain breaks. The other: a web app's attack surface (XSS, extension supply-chain, CDN takeover) is far larger than a native iOS app. I'd rather do one platform well than ship something that looks comprehensive but is unevenly secure.
Is migrating from 1Password / Bitwarden hard?
Direct import from 1Password / Bitwarden / LastPass / KeePass / Dashlane / Apple Keychain export files is supported. The whole import runs locally — nothing is uploaded. If your old manager's export format gives you trouble, email me and I'll add support.
Will pricing go up? Will the lifetime tier turn into a subscription?
$9.99 lifetime is permanent and includes all future updates. If a 'premium subscription' tier is ever added (e.g. deeper security analytics), it'll be subscription-only — existing lifetime features will never be moved behind it. That's a commitment I'm willing to put on this page.